Improving Quality and Preventing Error in Medical Practice by Sprague, Lisa
No. 753
ISSUE BRIEF
Improving Quality and Preventing
Error in Medical Practice
Wednesday, March 15, 2000
Washington, DC
A discussion featuring
Paul H. O’Neill
Chairman
Alcoa, and
Chairman
Working Together Consortium
Healthcare Initiative
Pittsburgh
John D. Clough, M.D., F.A.C.P.
Chairman
Division of Health Affairs
Cleveland Clinic Foundation
John M. Eisenberg
Administrator
Agency for Healthcare Research
  and Quality
Kenneth W. Kizer, M.D., M.P.H.
President and Chief Executive Officer
National Forum for Health Care Quality
Measurement and Reporting
Nancy Ridley, M.S.
Assistant Commissioner
Bureau of Health Quality Management
Department of Public Health
Massachusetts
 2
 
Analyst/Writer: 
Lisa Sprague
National Health Policy Forum
2021 K Street, NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20052
202/872-1390
202/862-9837 (fax)
nhpf@gwu.edu (e-mail)
www.nhpf.org (Web site)
Judith Miller Jones, Director
Karen Matherlee, Co-Director
Judith D. Moore, Co-Director
Michele Black, Publications Director
NHPF is a nonpartisan education and information
exchange for federal health policymakers.
ISSUE BRIEF/No. 753
Improving Quality and
Preventing Error
Front pages of major newspapers and lead stories of
network newscasts had a startling common message just
after Thanksgiving: medical mistakes are killing peo-
ple! The genesis of the outcry was the release of a
report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), To Err Is
Human: Building a Safer Health System.
The concerns expressed in the IOM report are not
really news, since iatrogenic injury and therapeutic
adverse outcomes are as old as medicine. Ernest Codman
in 1910 proposed a system of tracking patient outcomes
and studying those that were negative. Landmark studies
by Lucian Leape, Troyen Brennan, and colleagues doc-
umenting “adverse events” in hospital settings were first
published in 1991. The National Patient Safety Founda-
tion at the American Medical Association (AMA) and the
National Patient Safety Partnership brought together by
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) were both
founded in 1997. The National Health Policy Forum and
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations both sponsored meetings on patient safety
in 1999, while the Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion also called for legislative and regulatory attention to
reducing medical errors.1
Without doubt, however, the IOM report gave visibil-
ity to a problem that had largely been ignored—despite
the fact that medical error is responsible for more deaths
per year than motor vehicle accidents or breast cancer.
Several legislators, as well as President Clinton, have
recently signaled their intent to take action on the issue.
The IOM’s specific recommendations are not without
controversy. Should reporting of at least some kinds of
errors be mandatory, and where would the line be drawn?
How large a role should government play, at what level,
and who will bear the costs? What level of investment
will be required for data collection, protection, dissemina-
tion, and—of critical importance—analysis? Who will
develop standards and definitions? How can a workable
framework for apportioning responsibilities and promot-
ing cooperation among all parties be determined? How
can all health care facilities put into operation procedures
such as computerized prescription entry that can be shown
to save lives? What has prevented them from doing so?
While such questions may seem abstract, this Forum
session will make them more concrete by looking at
current efforts already under way at various administra-
tive levels. To begin, Paul O’Neill, chairman and former
chief executive officer of Alcoa, will describe how the
vision of an injury-free workplace that he pursued and
virtually achieved at Alcoa is being translated into a
vision of a city free of medication errors and nosocomial
(treatment-caused) infections. In fact, eradication of
these errors is just one element of a health quality
initiative O’Neill is spearheading in the greater Pitts-
burgh area. John Clough, M.D., will discuss the Cleve-
land Clinic’s error reduction efforts, focusing on both
internal and external challenges, obstacles, and stimuli.
Other speakers will address IOM recommendations
more directly. Nancy Ridley, assistant commissioner for
health quality management in the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Health, will relate her experience
with the state’s mandatory error reporting system.
Kenneth W. Kizer, M.D., M.P.H., president of the
National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement
and Reporting—also known as the National Quality
Forum—and past under secretary of health in the
Department of Veterans Affairs, will draw on his
experience with the VA’s error-reduction program and
will comment on the National Quality Forum’s role in
setting national standards. John Eisenberg, administra-
tor of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), will speak about the creation of a Center for
Patient Safety and the role of AHRQ in funding quality
research.
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QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
Just as the concerns about medical error have a
history that antedates the IOM, so do efforts to address
them. In addition to the public policy and cooperative
group responses referenced above, individual institu-
tions also have put programs into place. The Cleveland
Clinic faces many of the same hurdles that other pro-
vider organizations have confronted; these include, as
Clough has put it, “ten different databases, none of
which communicate with each other.” The clinic is
working to systematize data collection. But at the same
time that technical improvements are undertaken, the
delicate process of cultural change proceeds. Clough
sees three barriers to candor in any medical institution:
fear of legal liability; managerial defensiveness (the
initial impulse to shoot—or quietly bury—the messen-
ger); and mistrust in the ranks of new programs billed
(by management) as “constructive.”
Desirable as intramural progress is, improved
outcomes for a population require cooperation among
institutions, for example, in agreeing upon and adhering
to standards, benchmarking performance, and making
quality-related information available to consumers. The
record of such collaborations is ambiguous. The Cleve-
land Health Quality Choice (CHCQ) program collected
hospital data for a decade, publishing comparative
report cards. Some hospitals felt the expense of collect-
ing CHQC data could be better spent more directly,
criticized the measures, and saw little evidence that
employers and consumers were using the report cards in
selecting providers. The Cleveland Clinic system (with
its nine hospitals) eventually pulled out, triggering the
program’s demise.
Pittsburgh hopes for greater success, both regionally
and in building on the state’s data analysis efforts. The
Working Together Consortium’s Healthcare Initiative
(WTCHI) has brought employers, labor organizations,
physicians, hospitals, health plans, and other stake-
holders to the table to seek agreement on better ways to
deliver and pay for health care. At this time, more than
75 leaders are working to make southwest Pennsylvania
the nation’s pacesetter in quality of clinical care and
controlled costs through waste-free delivery. As a first
step toward these goals, WTCHI members have com-
mitted to a campaign to eliminate medication errors and
nosocomial infections in participating southwest Penn-
sylvania hospitals. The campaign embodies O’Neill’s
prescription for improvement: start by identifying a
small number of goals that (a) are not debatable, and (b)
require systemic change to accomplish.
The WTCHI charter illustrates the principle that
error reduction, while a worthy goal in its own right, is
only one step toward quality health outcomes for a
population. O’Neill suggests that the organizing prin-
ciple of a health system should be the individual patient
and that the best system would be one in which the
medical establishment withers away because the patient
is healthy. Where medical intervention is required, it
would be held to a recognized standard and, ultimately,
judged by its impact on the patient.
Obviously, today’s health care system is a long way
from this nirvana. But O’Neill’s ability to extrapolate
from industry to health care is one of WTCHI’s
strengths. Health care is widely acknowledged to be
well behind industries such as aviation and banking that
invested early on in the information systems and
training that have allowed them to perform more
efficiently and effectively. Where leading manufactur-
ers strive for “six sigma” quality (that is, fewer than 3.4
defects per million units), researchers such as Mount
Sinai School of Medicine’s Mark R. Chassin, M.D.,
have estimated that defect rates in some health care
categories (such as diagnosing and treating depression
or controlling hypertension) may reach 500,000 per
million instances.2
BACKGROUND TO THE IOM REPORT
The final report (1998) of the President’s Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry was titled Quality First: Better
Health Care for All Americans. Among many recom-
mendations, it included a chapter on reducing errors and
increasing safety in health care.
Responses to the commission’s report included
various patient-protection bills modeled on the report’s
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. Differing
versions ultimately adopted by the House and the
Senate are scheduled for conference. The bills share an
emphasis on access and coverage issues, considering
quality as a matter of whether beneficiaries in fact
receive the services they believe they were promised.
The IOM in June 1998 established a Committee on
the Quality of Health Care in America, under the
chairmanship of William C. Richardson, Ph.D., and the
staff direction of Janet Corrigan, who had filled the
same role with the president’s advisory commission. To
Err Is Human is the first in a planned series of reports.
Its focus is the actual delivery of medical care to
patients who have access to and are using the health
care system (though the authors acknowledge in passing
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that, when someone needs medical attention, the worst
quality is no care at all3).
The committee’s research review revealed that
medical error may account for as many as 98,000 in-
hospital deaths per year, with a price tag of $17 billion
to $29 billion attached to errors characterized as pre-
ventable.4 How has such a dismal situation come to be?
The IOM committee explains:
A general lack of information on and awareness of
errors in health care by purchasers and consumers
makes it impossible for them to demand better care. The
culture of medicine creates an expectation of perfection
and attributes errors to carelessness or incompetence.
Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of errors and
communication about how to correct them. The lack of
explicit and consistent standards for patient safety
creates gaps in licensing and accreditation and lets
health care organizations function without some of the
basic safety systems in place. The lack of any agency or
organization with primary responsibility for patient
safety prevents the dissemination of any cohesive
message about patient safety. . . . The external environ-
ment is not creating any requirement or demand for the
delivery system to reduce medical errors and improve
the safety of patients.5
It is this ignorance, fragmentation, and entrenchment that
the committee hopes to combat with its recommendations.
Center for Patient Safety
The IOM committee believes that a focal point is
needed for patient safety in health care, bringing to-
gether the various initiatives and mechanisms that now
exist. Its report recommends creating a Center for
Patient Safety within the Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality,6 and says the center should
 set the national goals for patient safety, track
progress in meeting these goals, and issue an
annual report to the president and congress on
patient safety; and
 develop knowledge and understanding of errors in
health care by developing a research agenda,
funding centers of excellence, evaluating methods
for identifying and preventing errors, and funding
dissemination and communication activities to
improve patient safety.7
The center’s mission would be two-pronged: helping to
prevent mistakes via research and education and analyz-
ing and making available the lessons to be learned from
errors already made.
The committee chose AHRQ as the site of the
proposed center in part because the agency already is
involved in a range of quality-related activities, includ-
ing patient safety. Indeed, the Healthcare Research and
Quality Act of 1999, which reauthorized and renamed
the agency, explicitly includes reducing errors in
medicine among its required activities. AHRQ is also
charged with linking research to practice improvement
and identifying and disseminating information relating
to the integration of quality information into purchaser
and consumer decision-making. The IOM report
observes that the agency’s demonstrated ability to
collaborate with other organizations, both public and
private, is a strong argument in its favor.
Given the reauthorizing language, it does not appear
that further legislative action would be required in order
for AHRQ to establish a center for patient safety;
however, funding is another matter. The IOM commit-
tee calls for initial annual funding of $30 million to $35
million, rising to $100 million over time. (This com-
pares with an annual $200 million for the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which
conducts research and makes recommendations for the
prevention of work-related illnesses and injuries.8)
The committee also weighed creating a stand-alone
center or locating it within NIH before settling on
AHRQ. The stand-alone idea, while facing a number of
philosophical and budgetary hurdles, would have the
advantage of independence from the regulatory function.
AHRQ does not itself regulate but is part of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, which does. Some
have suggested that provider organizations might be
more comfortable with an independent center, given the
role envisioned for it in analyzing error reports, dis-
cussed below. It might be remembered that the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS), so often invoked as a
model for health care, was created within NASA be-
cause an earlier attempt to establish such a system within
the Federal Aviation Administration was stalled by
distrust and fear of reprisal for reporting mistakes.
Reporting Systems
To Err Is Human points out that one way to learn from
mistakes is to establish a reporting system. Two important
functions can be served by a reporting system: it can hold
providers accountable for performance, or it can point the
way to improved safety. Theoretically, it can do both; in
practice, it may be difficult to find a balance. The IOM
committee addressed this tension by recommending a
two-tiered system.
Mandatory Reporting. The committee recommended
the following:
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A nationwide mandatory reporting system should be
established that provides for the collection of stan-
dardized information by state governments about
adverse events that result in death or serious harm.
Reporting should initially be required of hospitals and
eventually be required of other institutional and
ambulatory care settings.
The committee believes that mandatory systems
should focus on identifying adverse events attributable
to error that lead to serious patient harm or death. To be
effective, such systems would need a common set of
reporting standards, which would permit data to be
tracked over time, compared across locale, and aggre-
gated into national statistics. A commitment of re-
sources adequate to enable systems to analyze what
happened and follow up to ensure that appropriate steps
are taken by the responsible health care organization is
also critical to success.
The committee points to the National Quality
Forum—another outgrowth of recommendations from
the president’s advisory commission—as the body best
suited to develop and promulgate a core set of reporting
standards to be used by states. As with AHRQ, its
existing mission is compatible with this new role. The
National Quality Forum already is charged with devel-
oping a measurement framework for health care quality
and has appointed a framework board of health policy
experts who have each committed 20 percent of their
time to this effort. Federal legislation would be required
to direct the group to promulgate national standards and
encourage states to adopt them.
Error reporting is not a novel proposal. A survey
conducted by the Joint Commission on the Accredita-
tion of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in the spring
of 1999 revealed that at least one-third of states had
some form of adverse event reporting system in place.
These systems vary in terms of being voluntary or
mandatory, in volume of reporting, and in the types of
facilities involved (several states focus mainly on
nursing homes, for example.) Moreover, IOM follow-
up has confirmed that few states aggregate data or
analyze them to identify general trends. Reasons cited
were a lack of resources to upgrade computer systems
and inconsistency in reports submitted. A standardized
format would address the latter concern. As to the
former, the IOM calls on Congress to “provide funds
and technical expertise for state governments to estab-
lish or adapt their current error reporting systems to
collect the standardized information, analyze it, and
conduct follow-up as needed with health care organiza-
tions.”
Even if such assistance is forthcoming, there may be
states that choose not to establish a mandatory error
reporting system. In this eventuality, the IOM envisions
the Department of Health and Human Services stepping
into the breach. The department was also the fallback
for states that chose not to implement the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
When four states (including California) deferred to
partial or full federal enforcement, the department had
to assume the role of state regulator. It is unclear at this
time what proportion of the country’s error reporting
responsibility might revert to department staff as well.
The call for mandatory reporting of serious error has
drawn a mixed response from providers. All have
championed the goal of error reduction, but the Amer-
ican Nurses Association’s support for a mandatory
system is offset by the AMA’s misgivings. Former
AMA president Nancy Dickey, M.D., raised the issue
of malpractice, observing that what appears to be a
straightforward step “actually engenders all sorts of
problems with confidentiality and liability. . . . There are
still insurance companies that would advise a physician
not to say anything.”9 She added that the AMA is
opposed to mandatory reporting.
The question of whether any reporting should be
mandatory will be vigorously debated, but it is not
necessarily the most significant issue involved in a
national reporting system. It should be kept in mind, the
IOM points out, that the purpose of such a system is not
to collect and count reports. Analysis and communica-
tion are key. The limitations of state systems in these
areas cause some to wonder why the IOM chose to
recommend a network of state systems. Its report
explains that flexibility is needed at this stage because
no “best practice” has yet been identified. It is envi-
sioned that the Center for Patient Safety would work
with states to develop systems and that states would be
able to choose to collect and analyze data themselves or
to contract for these activities with an accrediting body
or a quality improvement organization (QIO) (formerly
known as a peer review organization (PRO), the entities
that monitor utilization and quality of care under
Medicare).
Some states have amassed considerable experience
and expertise that a national system could draw on. An
example is Massachusetts, where the Public Health
Department’s Division of Health Quality (DHQ)
determines whether an error is a system problem or a
practitioner problem. If the latter, it makes a report to
the appropriate board of registration (nursing, medicine,
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or pharmacy). If a systemic problem is indicated, DHQ
performs extensive analysis. Teams write up their
findings in a prescribed format and prepare a statement
of deficiencies that cites specific state regulations and
how they were violated. Other standards, such as Medi-
care conditions of participation, are incorporated by
reference; for some diagnoses and procedures, DHQ
has developed its own standards.
Voluntary Reporting. As the second tier of its report-
ing system, the IOM recommended that “the develop-
ment of voluntary reporting efforts should be encour-
aged.” An amalgam of voluntary systems, the second
part of the reporting scheme is designed to address
near-misses and cases of “very minimal patient harm.”10
The committee did not propose a national system in this
case, noting that a number of “good efforts” are already
in operation, particularly in the area of medications.11
Among these efforts are the following: 
 The FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System
(AERS), a data base containing information about
adverse drug reactions submitted directly to the
agency or reported via the MedWatch system de-
signed for use by health professionals.
 The Institute for Safe Medication Practice, which
has campaigned for improvements in drug naming,
packaging, labeling, and dispensing and which
recently joined forces with the American Hospital
Association in an initiative to reduce medication
errors in hospitals.
 U.S. Pharmacopeia, which administers a voluntary
medication error reporting system, including a
component called MedMarx, which allows employ-
ees of subscribing hospitals to report error-related
information anonymously via the Internet.
The committee also recognized that a national
system like the aviation industry’s ASRS would poten-
tially be inundated with reports and that a wide range of
expertise would have to be maintained (for example, an
analyst who understands drug interactions is not neces-
sarily conversant with device manufacturing or home
care staffing). They suggested that a number of “mini-
systems” for different types of problems might be
effective, provided that the systems had the capacity to
communicate among themselves about overlapping
problems.
The intent of voluntary error reporting is to study
and enhance safety, not to hold reporting institutions
accountable. This message seems to resonate with
policymakers. In a Rose Garden speech responding to
the IOM report (and calling on federal agencies and
contractors to institute safety programs) Clinton said:
Now let me be clear about one thing—ensuring
patient safety is not about fixing blame. It’s about
fixing problems in an increasingly complex system;
about creating a culture of safety and an environment
where medical errors are not tolerated. In short, it’s
about working together to zero in on patient safety,
and zero out preventable errors.”
Still, intent is one thing, and practical consequences
another. Where data exists, there will be a correspond-
ing interest in access to it—particularly on the part of
plaintiffs and their attorneys in malpractice cases. The
committee recognized that fear of legal discoverability
or involvement in a legal process would contribute to
underreporting of errors. Perhaps the central question
for the success of a voluntary reporting system is
confidentiality of the data reported. Thus, the IOM
further recommended:
Congress should pass legislation to extend peer review
protections to data related to patient safety and quality
improvement that are collected and analyzed by health
care organizations for internal use or shared with others
solely for the purpose of improving safety and quality.
The committee judged the peer review privilege to
be “the most promising existing source for legal data on
errors.” Forty-nine states (excluding New Jersey,
according to a JCAHO survey) have statutes protecting
from discovery the records and deliberations of peer
review committees. However, the significant variation
among these statutes in scope and specifications sug-
gests that a federal statute might be preferable. (This
was also a recommendation made by the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission in its June report to
Congress.) The IOM report points to statutes in Oklaho-
ma and California that might serve as models and also
notes that the federal Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986 (which established the National Practitio-
ner Data Bank) establishes peer review immunity from
damage suits when participants act in good faith in any
peer review process that meets the act’s standards for
structure and fair process.
QIOs may investigate instances of possibly substan-
dard care delivered to fee-for-service beneficiaries. In
such cases, their case review records are protected from
subpoena. This protection, modeled on in-hospital peer
review privilege, was written into the 1972 statute creat-
ing professional standards review organizations (PSROs),
and carried over as PSROs evolved into PROs and QIOs.
Its preservation has drawn some criticism: while providers
have welcomed confidentiality, consumer groups have
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long protested what many perceive as a “cover-up”
attitude.
One limitation of peer review privilege is that it may
be lost when information leaves the confines of an
institution. The committee wrote:
Collaborative quality improvement efforts may be
inhibited by the loss of statutory peer review protec-
tion that may occur when data are shared across
institutions. Some form of protection appears neces-
sary for each of the three components of an error
reporting system: (1) the original reporters; (2) the
various recipients of the information (including
processors, investigators, de-identifiers, and analyzers;
and (3) the reported information itself.12
POLICY ISSUES
The Bright Line
The IOM’s incorporation of a “narrowly defined”
mandatory system and a much broader voluntary effort
into its two-tiered system requires that a line be drawn
between errors involving serious harm and those
causing minimal damage. Where, in one case, a patient
dies as a result of an error and, in another case, an error
is caught before medication is administered to a patient,
assigning the two cases to the mandatory and voluntary
reporting systems respectively is easy. But there are
bound to be borderline cases. Is an extra day in the
hospital serious? What about a wound infection that led
to pronounced scarring? What if the wrong medication
were administered, with side effects such as sleepiness
or gastric distress?
Another concern is that it may at times be difficult
to isolate the effects of an error from other medical
complications. This is a weakness in the frequently
invoked National Transportation Safety Board (manda-
tory)/ASRS (voluntary) parallel, as the effects of a
plane crash are fairly easily distinguished from any
symptoms passengers may have brought on board. Is
modern medicine so complex that it may not always be
possible to recognize error?
Putting the Horse Before the Cart
Some analysts have already voiced concern that the
debate over mandatory versus voluntary reporting will be
a sticking point for implementing safety-improvement
proposals. They believe it may be more useful first to
come to agreement on—and establish in the public
mind—what any kind of a reporting system is intended to
accomplish and how its various parts fit together to
achieve an aim of improved safety and quality overall.
What information is needed in order to define what
good quality care is and whether care delivered in a
particular case meets that standard? How can a process
be designed to ensure collection of only data that will
be used?
Error data collection and analysis now occurs primar-
ily on an institutional basis (obviously with wide variation
among institutions). Institutional data will need to be
aggregated, used to develop comparison and benchmark-
ing instruments, and interpreted so as to provide meaning-
ful feedback. At the same time, the transfer of information
from one level of a reporting system, such as a hospital, to
another, such as a state, must not trigger legal liability if
the overall system is to be effective.
Equally important is communication in the other
direction. How will lessons learned by error analysis
make their way through organizational layers to reach
practitioners? How will entities at the same level (such
as states) communicate amongst themselves, or must
they rely on federal-level dissemination?
Another basic question is who will perform error
analysis. In considering medical necessity determina-
tions, review by a peer (be it another psychiatrist, a
cardiologist, a family physician, or a nurse) has been a
must-have for providers. Is it feasible that a team of
analysts could replicate a group of hospital colleagues
who are involved in a process that results in error?
The Role of the Individual
The IOM report focuses on the accountability of
health care institutions, such as hospitals. Its proposed
reporting systems posit error reports made by institu-
tions once they have undertaken their own internal
analysis. There is no mechanism for error reporting to
an outside body by an individual, such as a nurse,
within the institution, or by a patient who believes that
he or she was harmed.
Like the IOM’s proposal, JCAHO’s sentinel event
reporting policy focuses on institutions. Both expect an
institutional response to an error (or a near-miss) to be
part of the report. By contrast, the ASRS and the FDA’s
AERS make provision for reports from individuals.
This may be a matter of where analytical emphasis is
placed. The ASRS and the AERS, in accepting reports
of problems from an airline pilot or mechanic on the
one hand or from a prescriber or consumer of prescrip-
tion drugs on the other, seem to place greater responsi-
bility on their own analysts to unravel the problem.
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A central issue in pending patient protection legisla-
tion is the ability of a patient to appeal—and perhaps
ultimately to file suit over—a decision that he deems a
wrongful denial of care. Some of the same questions
with respect to patient empowerment are raised by error
reporting proposals.  What options should a patient
have? Focusing on institutions underlines the systemic
complexities to which experts attribute most medical
error and avoids searching for an individual scapegoat.
But does deflecting attention from individuals to
systems deemphasize the individual patient as well? As
the health care system continues to move from institu-
tional settings to more ambulatory and home-based
care, the role of the patient in care delivery grows even
more critical.
Finally, what are the rights of the patient or the
patient’s family members to be notified that an error
has occurred? To what extent should they be privy to
the results of an ensuing investigation by the health
care organization?
Purchaser Commitment
A complaint sometimes voiced with respect to
existing quality-reporting programs, such as HEDIS, is
that, after information is laboriously (and expensively)
collected, it carries little weight in employers’ contract-
ing decisions. Jon Gabel and colleagues, in a study
conducted for the Commonwealth Fund, found that just
5 percent of employers offering an HMO rated HEDIS
information as very important in selecting a plan.13 If
safety-conscious organizations that are willing to learn
from mistakes rather than conceal them are not re-
warded by more patients and/or more advantageous
contracts, error reporting loses the ability to drive
change that the IOM envisions for it. Some large
employers already are taking steps to factor patient-
safety measures into their procurement processes.
Medicare and Medicaid could have a powerful effect by
following suit.
The Culture of Medicine and
the Culture of Blame
It has been widely observed that a major challenge
to creating a culture of safety is the existing culture of
medicine, wherein physicians are schooled to believe
that they should be in control. While one might think
that it would be a relief to admit one’s human fallibility
or at least interdependency, the issue of blame acts as a
strong deterrent. Medicine may be a culture of perfec-
tion, but 21st century America seems to subscribe to a
culture of blame, the notion that “someone should pay”
when harm is done. The IOM has tried to address this
by recommending institutional accountability for
serious harm and a parallel system of constructive,
nonpunitive investigation and improvement. This is a
delicate balance; whether fear of liability on one hand
can co-exist with trust on the other remains to be seen.
Certainly the patient-safety advocates have been
eloquent. Donald Berwick, president of the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement and a member of the IOM
committee, has said, “You don’t get to safe systems that
have human beings in them by yelling at them or asking
them to try harder. You need to engineer the work envi-
ronment so that normal human limits are respected.”14
Some doctors, however, feel that looking to systems
solutions is just another interference on the part of
managed care. The chairman of medicine at a New
York hospital recently profiled in the New York Times
spoke to a group of interns about the importance of
personal responsibility, warning them not to “ship the
blame elsewhere—to a computer, to the next shift...to
the system.”15
THE FORUM SESSION
Key Questions
Among the questions to be addressed at this session
are the following:
 What factors are critical in eliciting commitment to
error reduction?
 Is the IOM’s emphasis on error reporting as a central
strategy the best way to proceed? What is the dy-
namic that will make a reporting system work as
intended? How can information about medical
errors and how to avoid (or correct) them be most
effectively accumulated and disseminated?
 Should a Center for Patient Safety be created?
Should it be part of a federal agency? Is AHRQ the
right place for it? Should the center have any type of
enforcement powers?
 Once error reports are made, who will analyze them?
Just as active-duty pilots rotate through the ASRS,
will practicing physicians and pharmacists rotate
through state error-reporting systems? How will error
systems counter probable physician complaints that
they are not being evaluated by their peers?
 Is there a role for consumers in medical error reduc-
tion? What about provider professional societies?
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 Why have not more institutions followed the lead of
the Veterans Health Administration and imple-
mented seemingly obvious safety procedures such as
computerized prescription entry and bar-coding
medications? What (or who) are the barriers to
taking steps already known to reduce error?
 Is there a way to merge the two currents in patient
protection? Can coverage appeals and other ele-
ments drawn from the Patient Bill of Rights and
error analysis and practice improvement share
common strategies?
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